Can virtue be taught by the many? Socrates insists that the perfection of our souls is of supreme importance, he defines virtue as that which will make our souls good if it comes to be present, and he claims that, if we do not already possess virtue, then we should seek some teacher of it. We shall assume that he is basically right: that if our ultimate aim is to live well, if this requires us to know how to do (...) so, and if we are unsure whether we already possess this know-how, then we should in the first instance seek some teacher in good living. 1 Who should it be? Not the many, according to Socrates.2 As a general rule, and especially on matters of virtue, he asserts that we should be guided by the one with expert knowledge rather than the many, who lack such knowledge. Unlike other interlocutors in other dialogues, Alcibiades disagrees. Having suggested that he has learnt justice from people in general, he meets Socrates' stock assertion that '[w]hen you give the credit to "people in general", you're falling back on teachers who are no good', and he responds with the thought that the many can teach lots of different things. If we aim to live well, this issue is of vital importance. Together with the Great Speech in the Protagoras, the ensuing discussion in the Alcibiades is the most extensive treatment in the Socratic dialogues of the competence of the general public to teach virtue. Accordingly, we shall approach the issue of whether the general public can teach virtue by examining Socrates' arguments, in particular, that the Greek public did not teach Alcibiades justice. (shrink)

Socrates declared that the unexamined life is not worth living, but if someone opens themselves up to Socratic cross-examination, they are likely to fail, and on a matter of no small importance—how best to live. They will want to be able to pass their exams. Fortunately, philosophers’ avowed aim is to teach and facilitate ethical reflection. Someone who aims to lead an examined life, then, will want these instructors to teach and to help them to pass elenctic exams on how (...) best to live. The purpose of this paper is to describe and defend a mode of philosophy instruction with this as its sole aim, by responding to various objections leveled against other approaches within the Socratic teaching tradition. (shrink)

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...) on reflection they seem less meaningful than we suppose. Thomas Nagel claims that this discrepancy is inevitable, and thus that our lives are absurd and to be approached with irony. The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations (of Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, and others) of the old idea that we can transcend this absurdity by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut. (shrink)

Rational agents, it seems, are capable of adopting intentions which make actions rational, which they would otherwise have reason not to do. This paper considers, and rejects, two explanations of this: Constraint Accounts, claiming that adopting such intentions renders one unable to act or to will otherwise; and Indirection accounts, claiming that doing so makes the intended action preferred to its alternatives. I argue that some such explanations are inconsistent with the claim intentions are conduct-controlling pro-attitudes, and others with the (...) claim an action is intentional only if caused and rationalized by some combination of mental states. (shrink)

Being a friend makes our lives better, but it seems this consideration cannot guide our pursuit of friendship, lest this mean we are not true friends and that our lives are not made better. The aim of this paper is to show how, appearances notwithstanding, being a true friend is consistent with having one's own happiness as one's ultimate end. Aristotle's idea that friends are other selves, and recent accounts of practical reason, show how (i) one's acting as a friend (...) could be motivated and justified by one's being a friend (and not directly by one's own happiness), and yet (ii) one's being a friend (and not one's friendly actions) is in turn supervised and justified by one's own happiness. The paper ends by considering whether such a person's pursuit of another's good is still too circumscribed by that of their own for them to count as a true friend. (shrink)

In a series of recent articles, Jean Hampton has argued that the widely accepted instrumental conception of reason is no more metaphysically benign than non-instrumental, typically moral, theories of reason. The purpose of this article is to provide the beginnings of a defence of instrumental conception of reason against Hampton's charges. In the first part, I take up her claim that instrumental norms rest on the same notion of normative authority as that employed by non-instrumental, or moral, theories. I argue (...) in response that the normativity involved in instrumental reasoning is no more problematic than that involved in deductive theoretical reasoning. In the second part of the article I take up Hampton's claim that the motivational force of instrumental norms can only be explained in the same nonnatural way as the motivational force of non-instrumental, or moral, norms. I argue in response that the motivational force of instrumental norms can be explained in a way analogous to the entirely naturalistic explanation of the "motivational force" of deductive theoretical norms. In sum, I argue that instrumental reasoning, unlike moral reasoning, is no more metaphysically problematic than deductive theoretical reasoning. (shrink)

Aristotle claims at Eudemian Ethics 1.2 that everyone who can live according to his own choice should adopt some goal for the good life, which he will keep in view in all his actions, for not to have done so is a sign of folly. This is an opinion shared by other ancients as well as some moderns. Others believe, however, that this view is false to the human condition, and provide a number of objections: (1) you can’t plan love; (...) (2) nor life’s surprises; (3) planning a whole life is of no use since the world changes too much; (4) as do our values; and (5) planning a life is something only dreary people would do. The aim of this paper is to examine these objections, as part of a broader attempt to defend the relevance of a eudaimonistic approach to the question of how to live well. (shrink)

This chapter argues that, under certain conditions, forming an intention makes an action rational which would otherwise not have been rational, since intentions (together with beliefs) in and of themselves provide deductive reasons for further intentions and actions, an argument which builds on previous work by R M Hare, Michael Bratman and others, It also provides an articulation and defense of the concept of "minimally constrained maximization" as a unified general solution to the well-known paradoxes of rationality, including the paradox (...) of deterrence and the prisoner's dilemma. (shrink)

Microbes in the gastrointestinal tract are under selective pressure to manipulate host eating behavior to increase their fitness, sometimes at the expense of host fitness. Microbes may do this through two potential strategies: (i) generating cravings for foods that they specialize on or foods that suppress their competitors, or (ii) inducing dysphoria until we eat foods that enhance their fitness. We review several potential mechanisms for microbial control over eating behavior including microbial influence on reward and satiety pathways, production (...) of toxins that alter mood, changes to receptors including taste receptors, and hijacking of the vagus nerve, the neural axis between the gut and the brain. We also review the evidence for alternative explanations for cravings and unhealthy eating behavior. Because microbiota are easily manipulatable by prebiotics, probiotics, antibiotics, fecal transplants, and dietary changes, altering our microbiota offers a tractable approach to otherwise intractable problems of obesity and unhealthy eating. (shrink)

The pace of change and, indeed, the sheer number of clinical ethics committees has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Committees were formed to support healthcare professionals and to operationalise, interpret and compensate for gaps in national and professional guidance. But as the role of clinical ethics support becomes more prominent and visible, it becomes ever more important to address gaps in the support structure and misconceptions as to role and remit. The recent case of Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children (...) NHS Foundation Trust v MX, FX and X, [21]–[23] and [58]) has highlighted the importance of patient/family representation at clinical ethics committee meetings. The court viewed these meetings as making decisions about such treatment. We argue that this misunderstands the role of ethics support, with treatment decisions remaining with the clinical team and those providing their consent. The considered review by clinical ethics committees of the moral issues surrounding complex treatment decisions is not a matter of determining a single ethical course of action. In this article, we consider current legal understandings of clinical ethics committees, explore current concepts of ethics support and suggest how they may evolve, considering the various mechanisms of the inclusion of patients and their representatives in ethics meetings which is not standard in the UK. (shrink)

Background Partnering with patients in healthcare research now benefits from a strong rationale and is encouraged by funding agencies and research institutions. However, this new approach raises ethical issues for patients, researchers, research professionals and administrators. The main objective of this review is to map the literature related to the ethical issues associated with patient partnership in healthcare research, as well as the recommendations to address them. Our global aim is to help researchers, patients, research institutions and research ethics (...) boards reflecting on and dealing with these issues. Methods We conducted a scoping review of the ethical issues and recommendations associated with partnering with patients in healthcare research. After our search strategy, 31 peer reviewed articles published between 2007 and 2017 remained and were analyzed. Results We have identified 58 first-order ethical issues and challenges associated with patient partnership in research, regrouped in 18 second-order ethical themes. Most of the issues are transversal to all phases and stages of the research process and a lot of them could also apply to patient-partnership in other spheres of health, such as governance, quality improvement, and education. We suggested that ethical issues and challenges of partnered research can be related to four ethical frameworks: 1) Research ethics; 2) Research integrity; 3) Organizational ethics, and 4) Relational ethics. Conclusions We have identified numerous ethical issues associated with the recent approach of patient-partnership in research. These issues are more diverse than the issues associated with a more traditional research approach. Indeed, the current discussion on how we address ethical issues in research is anchored in the assumption that patients, as research participants, must be protected from risk. However, doing research with, and not on, the patient involves changes in the way we reflect on the ethical issues associated with this approach to research. We propose to broaden the ethical discussion on partnered research to not only rely on a research ethics framework, but to also frame it within the areas of research integrity, organizational ethics and relational ethics. (shrink)

In this review of Matthew DeCoursey’s book on the aesthetics of drama education, I acknowledge the originality and usefulness of the theoretical framework he provides and attempt to summarize its key features. In applying them to an example of my own practice, I make use of the conceptual terminology DeCoursey has introduced and argue that it is both effective and illuminating to the practitioner. In tracing the trajectory of DeCoursey’s subsequent analysis of key theorists in the field, the study (...) of scripted drama, and the extensive use of drama across the curriculum, I attempt to do justice to the strengths of his argument, as well as pointing out what I perceive as some of its inherent weaknesses. I conclude by indicating some gaps in his attention to both historical and current practices in the field while still commending the book for its much-needed contribution. (shrink)

This paper offers a brief historical survey of the development of analytic philosophy in Hong Kong from 1911 to the present day. At first, Western philosophy was a minor subject taught mainly by part-time staff. After the Second World War, research and teaching in analytic philosophy in Hong Kong began to grow and consolidate with the expansion of higher-education and the establishment of new universities. Analytic philosophy has been a significant influence on comparative and Chinese philosophy and played a crucial (...) role in the teaching and promotion of critical thinking. Analytic philosophers in Hong Kong are now active participants in the global philosophical community. We review the development of analytic philosophy across the major tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and discuss some of the future challenges faced by the discipline. (shrink)

The primary focus of Susanne Mantel’s excellent 'Determined by Reasons' is to develop a distinctive abilities-based account of acting in response to normative reasons, one which is clearly modelled on extant ability-theoretic accounts of knowledge. This review sketches Mantel’s account and raises a worry: that the account fails to characterise the sort of abilities constitutively involved in responding to reasons because it allows that agents can act for the reason that p even if their belief that p is not (...) accessible to conscious reasoning. (shrink)

The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others (Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 160-165, 2013a, Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 304-305, 2013b). A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” (Gallotti (...) and Frith 2013a, p.160) that is neither strictly individualistic – in the sense that a we-mode state is enabled by the joint involvement of (an)other(s) – nor strictly pluralistic – in the sense that the involved individuals, rather than a ‘group’, are the bearers of the relevant joint intention(s). Whilst I concur with the idea that, in certain circumstances, we cognise from an irreducible ‘first-person plural perspective’, Gallotti & Frith’s existing proposal of we-mode cognition is in need of theoretical clarification. In this paper, I deliver such clarification so that the theory of we-mode cognition is re-defined as: (a). sensitive to the phenomenological transformation that is induced by the embodied co-presence of others, and (b). limited to cases in which one intentionally attends to the capacities of one’s co-participant in joint action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of ArtJoe WinstonOnly a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art, by Alexander Nehamas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, 186 pp., $29.95 cloth.We cannot doubt that, since the turn of the new millennium, there has been something of what Michael Bérubé has called a "Return to Beauty" in cultural and (...) literary scholarship.1 Bérubé locates the beginning of this return in an article written by Marjorie Perloff for the Chronicle of Higher Education in December 4, 1998, and in an opinion that he shares with Rita Felski, he sees it as a misguided attack on cultural studies.2 It is clear that when Elaine Scarry spoke disparagingly of "the enemies of beauty" in her influential book On Beauty and Being Just, she had the more extreme relativists of cultural studies in her sights.3 Far from being a short-lived spat, however, the renewed scholarly interest in beauty has grown, moved on a pace, and shows no sign of intellectual exhaustion; and most of this work has not, as Bérubé would have us believe, directed itself against postmodern aesthetics. Wendy Steiner, in The Trouble with Beauty, took Modernism and the art of the twentieth-century avant-garde as her target;4 whereas John Armstrong's The Secret Power of Beauty provided a sustained and accessible look at the history of aesthetic thought and reminded us of the significance of beauty in our lives, as both a concept and as a value.5 Arthur Danto's The Abuse of Beauty traced, like Steiner, the rejection of beauty to the rise of Modernism. Significantly, he did not attack Modernist art but recognized how it drove a wedge between beauty and the arts, showing us in the process that art need not be beautiful to be of value. In reassessing Modernism's rejection of beauty, however, Danto concluded by arguing forcefully that if beauty need not be excluded from art, it cannot be excluded from everyday living: "Beauty is an option for art but not a necessary condition. But it is not an option for life. It is a necessary condition for life as we would want to live it"6When a scholar with the reputation of Alexander Nehamas turns his attention to beauty, then we know it is still on the agenda in a big way. As with John Armstrong's work, one of the many delights of this book is its clarity of expression and the accessibility of its prose. In no way is Nehamas ever talking down to or patronizing the reader, however. He takes us on a philosophical journey that is rigorously argued and backed up by a wide selection of examples drawn chiefly from the world of art, which is indeed the subject of the writer's attention. If he has cultural studies in his sights, then he is very quiet about it. In fact, the canonical writers of cultural studies, whether they be Foucault, Bourdieu, Williams, or Gramsci, are entirely absent from the text. Instead, the central role goes to Plato—on whom Nehamas has written in two previous publications7—with important [End Page 124] contributions from Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietszche, and Clive Bell, not to mention Proust and Thomas Mann or the artworks themselves. This has a strong whiff of the canon about it perhaps; be that as it may, only a reviewer with a very large ideological drum to beat could remain deaf to the argument itself. For these individuals are all supportive of Nehamas's own thinking and of the argument he has himself developed, which, I think, is not only important to the world of art and art education but, more broadly, to the aesthetics of contemporary schooling itself.Before beginning to look at this argument in detail, it is worth noting that Nehamas has something telling to say about the principles and role of the reviewing process, something that cannot but make me feel wryly self-conscious as I begin it here. A review, he tells us, is a kind of advertisement to help... (shrink)

Mensch and Barge in their interpretation of Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of genealogical ethics as a basis of ethical weakness in the emerging field of “leadership-as-practice,” suggest that L-A-P is lacking in ethical grounding especially because of its relativist philosophy. I address this valid ethical concern in L-A-P theory by arguing that there is a form of realism in Nietzchean axiology and that the dialogic potentialities in material-social interactions may offer a greater capacity for ethical reflexivity than a reliance on rules.

Harmonic Grammar (HG) and Optimality Theory (OT) are closely related formal frameworks for the study of language. In both, the structure of a given language is determined by the relative strengths of a set of constraints. They differ in how these strengths are represented: as numerical weights (HG) or as ranks (OT). Weighted constraints have advantages for the construction of accounts of language learning and other cognitive processes, partly because they allow for the adaptation of connectionist and statistical models. HG (...) has been little studied in generative linguistics, however, largely due to influential claims that weighted constraints make incorrect predictions about the typology of natural languages, predictions that are not shared by the more popular OT. This paper makes the case that HG is in fact a promising framework for typological research, and reviews and extends the existing arguments for weighted over ranked constraints. (shrink)

Religion is an important element of end-of-life care on the paediatric intensive care unit with religious belief providing support for many families and for some staff. However, religious claims used by families to challenge cessation of aggressive therapies considered futile and burdensome by a wide range of medical and lay people can cause considerable problems and be very difficult to resolve. While it is vital to support families in such difficult times, we are increasingly concerned that deeply held belief in (...) religion can lead to children being potentially subjected to burdensome care in expectation of ‘miraculous’ intervention. We reviewed cases involving end-of-life decisions over a 3-year period. In 186 of 203 cases in which withdrawal or limitation of invasive therapy was recommended, agreement was achieved. However, in the 17 remaining cases extended discussions with medical teams and local support mechanisms did not lead to resolution. Of these cases, 11 (65%) involved explicit religious claims that intensive care should not be stopped due to expectation of divine intervention and complete cure together with conviction that overly pessimistic medical predictions were wrong. The distribution of the religions included Protestant, Muslim, Jewish and Roman Catholic groups. Five of the 11 cases were resolved after meeting religious community leaders; one child had intensive care withdrawn following a High Court order, and in the remaining five, all Christian, no resolution was possible due to expressed expectations that a ‘miracle’ would happen. (shrink)

The target article criticises reductionist programs in cognitive science for failing to take into account important explanatory features of the organism's physical embodiment and task environment. My aim in this commentary is to show how such features are increasingly being taken seriously by (some) researchers in cognitive neuroscience, who describe the functional activity of neural structures in terms that are context-sensitive rather than intrinsic. This approach can allow us to take seriously the concerns presented in Gallagher’s [2019] target article without (...) having to completely give up on neuroscientific explanations of human behaviour. (shrink)

The papers by Nancy Kass, Ruth Faden, and colleagues describe an ethical imperative to study clinical care as it is being delivered. The goal of learning from each patient is attractive, but integrating research and clinical practice is not easy. The authors suggest that the bioethical framework in use for the past forty years to oversee clinical research may be as much an impediment to the development of a learning health care system as a means of protecting the interests of (...) patients. This framework draws a bright line between clinical research and clinical care activities, subjecting clinical research to institutional review and ongoing oversight while assuming that clinical care is conducted primarily in the interests of patients and not in need of additional ethical oversight. The authors identify five characteristics that have been used to distinguish the two activities, and they conclude that none succeed. The practical implications of this conclusion are left unspecified, however. Should ethical oversight simply be eliminated for these kinds of research activities on the grounds that oversight is not mandated for clinical care and the two cannot be distinguished? (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical (...) science. We argue that the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

In Winning Votes by Abusing Reason, Jamie Carlin Watson combines research from epistemology, political philosophy, psychology, and economics in constructing a sophisticated argument that challenges unspoken commitments held by those engaged in politics. Watson’s main focus is what he calls the ‘problem of political rhetoric’. He asks whether we can ever really learn anything from the testimony of politicians. He is not optimistic. Watson argues that political rhetoric is damaging to our reasoning faculties. He sees no solution to this problem, (...) and recommends that we focus on individual or local efforts to improve our reasoning. I outline the structure of Watson’s argument before noting two potential ways we might resist his conclusion. (shrink)

Physical Computation is the summation of Piccinini’s work on computation and mechanistic explanation over the past decade. It draws together material from papers published during that time, but also provides additional clarifications and restructuring that make this the definitive presentation of his mechanistic account of physical computation. This review will first give a brief summary of the account that Piccinini defends, followed by a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book, before finally discussing one aspect of the account in more critical (...) detail. (shrink)

Corporate citizenship represents various organizational activities and status related to the organization's societal and stakeholder obligations. This study develops five different dimensions of corporate citizenship and examines the relationship between the five dimensions and purchase intention by including two key mediators. In the proposed model of this study, purchase intention is indirectly affected by economic, legal, ethical, general philanthropic, and strategic philanthropic citizenship via the mediation of corporate identification and brand trust. Empirical testing using a survey of 353 consumers from (...) various industries confirms most of our hypothesized effects. Last, managerial implications for corporate leaders and limitations of our findings are discussed in depth. (shrink)

Background: The law and literature about children’s consent generally assume that patients aged under-18 cannot consent until around 12 years, and cannot refuse recommended surgery. Children deemed pre-competent do not have automatic rights to information or to protection from unwanted interventions. However, the observed practitioners tend to inform young children s, respect their consent or refusal, and help them to “want” to have the surgery. Refusal of heart transplantation by 6-year-olds is accepted. Research question: What are possible reasons to explain (...) the differences between theories and practices about the ages when children begin to be informed about elective heart surgery, and when their consent or refusal begins to be respected? Research design, participants and context: Research methods included reviews of related healthcare, law and ethics literature; observations and conversations with staff and families in two London hospitals; audio-recorded semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of 45 healthcare professionals and related experts; interviews and a survey with parents and children aged 6- to 15-years having elective surgery (not reported in this paper); meetings with an interdisciplinary advisory group; thematic analysis of qualitative data and co-authorship of papers with participants. Ethical considerations: Approval was granted by four research ethics committees/authorities. All interviewees gave their informed written consent. Findings: Interviewees explained their views and experiences about children’s ages of competence to understand and consent or refuse, analysed by their differing emphases on informed, signified or voluntary consent. Discussion: Differing views about children’s competence to understand and consent are associated with emphases on consent as an intellectual, practical and/or emotional process. Conclusion: Greater respect for children’s practical signified, emotional voluntary and intellectual informed consent can increase respectful understanding of children’s consent. Nurses play a vital part in children's practitioner-patient relationships and physical care and therefore in all three elements of consent. (shrink)

Moral or ethical questions are vital because they affect our daily lives: what is the best choice we can make, the best action to take in a given situation, and ultimately, the best way to live our lives? Health ethics has contributed to moving ethics toward a more experience-based and user-oriented theoretical and methodological stance but remains in our practice an incomplete lever for human development and flourishing. This context led us to envision and develop the stance of a “living (...) ethics”, described in this inaugural collective and programmatic paper as an effort to consolidate creative collaboration between a wide array of stakeholders. We engaged in a participatory discussion and collective writing process known as instrumentalist concept analysis. This process included initial local consultations, an exploratory literature review, the constitution of a working group of 21 co-authors, and 8 workshops supporting a collaborative thinking and writing process. First, a living ethics designates a stance attentive to human experience and the role played by morality in human existence. Second, a living ethics represents an ongoing effort to interrogate and scrutinize our moral experiences to facilitate adaptation of people and contexts. It promotes the active and inclusive engagement of both individuals and communities in envisioning and enacting scenarios which correspond to their flourishing as authentic ethical agents. Living ethics encourages meaningful participation of stakeholders because moral questions touch deeply upon who we are and who we want to be. We explain various aspects of a living ethics stance, including its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as some barriers to its enactment based on the reflections resulting from the collaborative thinking and writing process. (shrink)

For paediatric medicine to advance, research must be conducted specifically with children. Concern about poor recruitment has led to debate about payments to child research participants. Although concerns about undue influence by such ‘compensation’ have been expressed, it is useful to determine whether children can relate the time and inconvenience associated with participation to the value of payment offered. This study explores children's ability to determine fair remuneration for research participation, and reviews payments to children participating in research. Forty children (...) were interviewed before outpatient visits at two London Hospitals: Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital and the Whittington Hospital District General Hospital. Children were asked to value their involvement in two hypothetical research scenarios – the first an ‘additional blood sample’, the second also involving daily oral oil capsules taken for a fortnight before further venesection. Background knowledge about familiarity with money, and experience with hospitalisation was assessed. The mean valuation of involvement in the second scenario (£13.18) was higher than in the first (£2.84) (p<0.001). This higher valuation persisted when children were categorised into groups ‘aged 12+’ and ‘below 12’. Those undergoing a blood test on the day placed a higher valuation on participation in the second scenario (£10.43, £21.67, p=0.044). These children aged 8–16 demonstrated the capacity to discern a fair valuation for participation in medical research. The monetary sums are influenced by the time and inconvenience involved in the research, and by the extent of recent experience with hospital procedures. The authors review current ethical thinking regarding payments to child research participants and suggest that a fair wage model might be an ethically acceptable way to increase participation of children in research. (shrink)

After five years of consultation, the Institute of Biology formally organized in early 1950. Its goals were twofold: first, to watch relevant legislation and provide the voice of British biologists on international issues; second, to serve the labor and community needs of British biology in both academic and industrial sectors. Years later the institute expanded to incorporate other roles: consultant accreditation, biology education, degree regulation, and history of biology.This anthology celebrates the institute's fiftieth anniversary. Short papers written by members of (...) the institute's history of biology network focus on particular decades. These are interspersed with brief recollections from select participants in institute activities. Appendixes list institute officers, symposia titles, publications, and details on the organization and events of institute branches.These authors practice history as chronology and fact‐collecting. They ask limited questions of past events. No effort is made to connect institute activities to larger issues. No effort is made to understand why these events took place, what enabled them, or how their character came to be defined. No effort is made to compare what happened here with what happened along similar lines elsewhere in British science, British labor, or the life sciences abroad. No effort is made to justify claims of impact and influence. This book is simply a celebration of activity written for insiders who are celebrating their own achievements. Although they can be proud of their accomplishments, this book fails to offer much meaningful explanation.Edited by Brian J. Ford, this book has two values for analytical historians. First, some reminiscences offer interesting suggestions for future study, such as Sam Berry's tale about proposing a Royal Society of Biology. Second, the simple collecting of facts makes this book useful for reference, though an index would have been helpful. For more than this, historians must look elsewhere. (shrink)

Many scholars have suggested the relationship between corporate social performance and its ability to attract a large number of high-quality job applicants, because previous literature indicates that employees with strong social awareness help create a high-performance organization. For that reason, an important issue for successful business recruitment is how to boost the pursuit intention of job seekers. This study discusses such issue by proposing a model based on signaling theory and cognitive dissonance theory. In the proposed model of this study, (...) the positive relationships between four dimensions of corporate social performance and job pursuit intention are hypothetically moderated by socio-environmental consciousness. The proposed hypotheses of this research were empirically tested using the data from graduating students seeking a job. The empirical findings of this study complement previous literature by discussing how corporate social performance benefits business firms from a perspective of strengthened human resources and recruitment. Finally, managerial implications for business managers based on the findings herein are provided. (shrink)